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1. Introduction
In economics, like in other social sciences, there are discussions with
periodical intermissions on whether the science in question should or
could be value-free. The problem is, as far as economics is concerned,
not unknown. Even though the first conflict of inethods between persons
such as G. von Schmoller and C. Menger was primarily about the relation-
ship induction-deduction, fact-theory, yet in the background the problem
of 'Wertungen' constituted a fundamental part in the conflict between
the historical and the Austrian school.
In the early seventies the discussions about whether economics should or
could be value-free, were kindled again and they still continue. It is
one of the fundamental issues between the conventional orthodox and the
radícal unorthodox economic doctrine. The orthodox economic doctrine
comprises various neoclassical schools of thought with many post-
Keynesian elements - P. Samuelson and R. Solow use the term 'neoclassic-
al synthesis' here - as well as the neo-liberal monetary theories (M.
Friedman). The neo-institutionalists, the neo-ricardian, also called the
English Cambridge School, and the radical marxist-oriented economists
belong to be radical unorthodox economic doctrine.I)
The discussion about the postulate whether economics should or could be
value-free, originates in the qualms about the work of the scientific
community of professional economists. The formalization of economic
theory leads, according to its critics, to the loss of a certain sense
of realism. Moreover in the late eixties we see everywhere a shift of
attention of the individual who acts autonomously, to the external
social influence on his behaviour. And if it is also taken into account
that the traditional concept of man and the world is liable to erosion,
and that the conflict between the different paradigms within economics2
is a reflection of the cultural crisis, then the vehemence of the dis-
cussions can partly be explained.
2. Value-freedom as an academíc and politícal problem
In the periodically recurring debate a lot of aspects of economic theor-
izing are overturned. However, actual progress in these problems and
more understanding of each other's point of view has hardly been reached
so far.
Nevertheless, two issues emerge in this problematic nature:
a) The debates conducted are in danger of degenerating into all sorts of
terminological misunderstandings. H. Seiffert remarks that the debat-
ers have no communal use of language and that the same term has a
different coloured connotation for each debater. The opposing econom-
ic doctrines form virtually closed quotation-communities.2) In order
to carry on the debate in a sensible way it is therefore of the
utmost importance to enunciate the different economic contexts, so
that a mutually correct translation of each other's terms can take
place.
b) It is not allowed to conclude from what has been said above that the
problem in question is only an 'academic' matter, which only concerns
language-analysts and philosophers of science. The problem of value-
freedom ís ultimately one with political implications. In thís case
the word 'political' should not be taken in its narrow connotation of
party-politics, but ín its broad connotation i.e. concerning society
- think of the Greek connotation of 'polis' -. The problem of value-
freedom has to do with a difference in visíon about the relationship
individual-society and with that a different paradigmatic approach of
economic scientific research. The fact that the demarcation line
between advocates and opponents of a value-free economic science runs
parallel with that between orthodox and unorthodox economists, imme-
diately points in that direction.
The problem of value-freedom is ultimately not a formal methodological
problem but depends on the substance of the economic theory that is3
supported. This has the following consequences: formal scientific values
such as logical precision, consistency and intersubjective empirical
testing are not so much the criteria on the basis of which one selects a
certain economic theory. The circuit is rather made in an opposite
direction. The political vision of economic reality works as a signifi-
cant a priori concerning the choice of economic theory and the direction
of the analysis. So the theory-loaded observation itself is politically
commítted.3) For the problem whether economic science should be devoid
of value-judgements, this means [hat here too the positions taken are
not determined by formal scientific arguments but is ultimately legitim-
ated from a poli[ical point of view. Therefore this paper will in the
first place pay attention to the different frames of reference that both
parties use in this debate. However, this immedíately leads to the
necessity to explicitly state the different world-views, which are at
the basis of these conflicting economic theories.
3. The various connotations of the term 'positivism'
One of the terms that needs to be defined beforehand, is the term 'posi-
tívism'. That is to say the value-freedom debate is characterized as a
conflict between positive and normative economic science.
So-called positivism is found in rather different shades of ineaning.
a) In A. Comte's case positivism implicitly signifies a philosophy of
life. Only a sensory perceptable world exists. Supersensory percept-
ible realities (e.g. God) do not exist. Classícal political economy
of persons such as A. Smith and D. Ricardo with i[s objectivist
concept of science has been strongly influenced by a similar positi-
vism that was rising in those days and that later was systematically
elaborated by Comte.
b) After A. Comte's positivism neopositivism which was also called
logical positivism or logical empiricism, was developed by the Vienna
Círcle in the years 1930-1936. This neopositivism is not a phílosophy
of life like classical positivism but a theory of knowledge. Accord-
ing to this doctrine science is the only source of reliable know-
ledge, and entirely relies upon data from directly sensory percept-
ions. It is a question of 'pre-theoretical' perception. Here fac[
performs the function of an independent referee.4
c) The critical rationalism of K. Popper, H. Albert and others speaks of
a theory-loaded perception in contrast with logical positivism.
According to this critical rationalism the theory is not supported by
the bare facts but the facts are also constituted by the theory, or
in other words: our perception is always influenced by a certain
interpretation. However, K. Popper with his critical dualism which
consists of a separation between facts and decisions, advocates a
science that is free of value-judgements. In his opinion norms are
conventions that can be traced back to human decisions.
d) In spite of the fact that K. Popper criticizes logical positivism, he
is often considered by economists to be a positivist. H. Katouzian
and B. Caldwell look upon this as a misunderstanding.4) N. Barry
reduces this misunderstanding to carelessness in distinguishing
between positive and positivistic economics. Positive economics is a
science that adopts an independent attitude towards ethical prin-
ciples.5) M. Friedman uses the word positive in this general connot-
ation, when he divides economic science after N.J. Keynes' example
into positive economics, normative economics and economics as art.6)
The popperian point of view with its dichotomy between "is" and
"ought" therefore belongs to the positive tradition. The term posití-
vistic economics points at a kind of economics that takes up neoposi-
tivism's view on the logical status of economic knowledge. In this
connotation K. Popper as an opponent of logical positivism, is no
positivist.
The statement that K. Popper is a positivist, becomes somewhat more
consistent when looked upon from the situation of the normative
economists and especially of those who advocate a dialectic pursuit
of science. Politícal values are of importance to K. Popper, but they
should be kept from science, because the rules for rational deba[e on
political values are considered to be distinct from those in science.
According to unorthodox economists political values play a role in
theory. This norma[ive influence does according to dialecticíans not
necessarily affect the scientífic character of economic knowledge,
because these political points of view themselves can be reasoned5
rationally.~~ J. Habermas, for example, talks about normative ration-
ality. Whereas K. Popper turns against logical positivism, because
the perception is not pre-theoretical but theory-loaded, he, in his
turn, is called a positivist by dialectic economis[s because of his
critical dualism.
4. The double meaning of the term political economy
Conventional economic doctrine concentrates on pure economic theory
construction. Critícal dissidents therefore reproach orthodox economics
with ahistorical and apolitical thought. They themselves support a more
social historical approach of economic problems.
Characterizing the distinction between positive and normative economics
as a difference between apolitical and political economics does not seem
to be very successful in our eyes. When M. Weber advocates value-free
economic science, then this postulate itself is socíally determined. The
so-called depoliticízation of economics is itself based on certain
polítical presuppositions.
Here we have to do with the distinction between politics in a transcen-
dental and a categorial connotation. Seen from the transcendental pers-
pective the political dimension is a pre-predicative basic experience
which precedes every categorial predícative experience and whích is at
the basis of this experience. Hence we are concerned with the transcen-
dental political a priori of all factual political at[itudes. 0.
Duintjer tersely defines the characteristics of those transcendental
conditions or basic orientation: "by transcendental we do not mean
something that is out of human reach - so not transcendent - or an
object within that reach - so not immanent - but the reach itself with
which we are already familiar".8~ This horizon of transcendental presup-
positions is not immediately visible but only indirectly visible through
our actions. The transcendental basis is not immediately given but is
given along with all our given interpretations.
If we apply all this to the political dimension, then we will see that
being apolitical in the categoríal sense always presupposes a certain6
form of being political in the transcendental sense. From the transcen-
dental point of view positive economics should in any case be called
political, in as far as it is implicitly supported by a political philo-
sophy. Economics in this sense can at best be called apolitical from a
categorial point of view in as far as it rejects what J. Schumpeter
calls a 'soziale Betrachtungsweise'.
So Weber's option for value-freedom is itself based on a preference for
certain political values. In the 'Aufkl~rung' value-freedom does not
mean deliverance from all values but from a certain frame of values,
namely that of throne and altar. Enligh[ened thought, however, realizes
too little that it opts for a specific form of political action with
that. Therefore it is often said that Enlightenment, in its struggle
against authoritarian ideologies, has fallen into the pitfall of its own
ideology. Its ideology consists of the belief of being able to remove
all presuppositions. The prejudice of this way of thinking is a prejud-
ice against all prejudices itself.
The fact that value-freedom itself is based on a political a priori also
enables an ideological reversal to take place behind this term without
being noticed. The term 'value-freedom' then represents different polit-
ical backgrounds. In this way value-freedom which in [he days of M.
Weber prevented social sciences to become instruments in the hands of
the establishment, now threatens to advance thís subordination.
5. The reconstruction of the orthodox economic frame of reference
The frame of reference of orthodox economics assumes the rationality of
the individual and the market mechanísm.9~ Therefore it ís based on a
concept of society according to which the economic activities of indivi-
dual consumers and producers are melted into an economic equilibrium by
way of the price- and market-mechanism. The government only has an ad
hoc task to correct possíble irregularities that disturb this market
mechanism.
Logical positivism and popperian thought fully fit into the frame of
these orthodox economic theories.l~~ Logical positivism is based on thesame ontological vision. It assumes an indívidualistíc and voluntaristic
concept of man. The absolute autonomy, in the sense of independence, of
the individual is put in a central position. Thís sense of autonomy
includes further as kernel the separation of subject and object, of
subjective and objective sphere. Fact belongs to the objective sphere
and norm to the subjective sphere. The criterion of objectivity of this
positive concept of experience has, however, not been derived from
experience. It is based on an aprioristic presupposítion concerning the
relationship between man and world. The values are here taken to be the
'inner' activities of the subject. They depend on human decisíons and
therefore have a highly subjective and arbitrary character.
K. Popper's concept of man and society does not differ from this sub-
jectivistíc and voluntaristic philosophy of positivism. The neopositivi-
stic separation of knowing subject and objective reality returns here in
the critical dualism because of its disjunction of norms and scientific
activi[ies. Values, norms or aims are referred to the domain of indivi-
dual, personal responsibility by K. Popper. The validity of values is a
matter of faith, not of reason. M. Friedman also conaiders the value-
judgement to be a sheer emotional reaction. Most of the times this
thesis is supported by quotíng this old wisdom: de gustibus non est
disputandum.ll)
This critical rationalism with its formal methodological approach fully
fits in the frame of thought of neoclassical theories. These theories
are, as J. Schumpeter has shown, based on methodological individualism
and on the postulate of formal rationalíty.l2) Neoclassical thought
studies neither the aims nor the means as far as their content and
desirability are concerned, according to S. Latouche.l3)
If within the meaning-context of orthodox economics, which context ís
based ín the philosophical conceptions of positivistic thought, consíst-
ency i s aimed at, then only a science without value-judgements can be
upheld. Norms and values, that depend here voluntaristically on indivi-
dual and subjective preferences, will not be considered for a scientífic
approach. Rational approach has to confine i tself within this con-8
text to the supply of ineans or to the investigation of possible conse-
quences and side effects of chosen goals.
Orthodox economics behaves consistently in view of its starting-points
and the frame of reference that is linked up with it when it rejects
evaluative economics. Normative economic science would not fit ín this
context, for irrational subjective normal preferences as a matter of
faith make a rational approach in the sense of the orthodox context
impossible. Conventional economics, accepting the idea of a normative
science, would then run counter to its own theoretical and philosophical
presuppositions about man and society. The negatively defined sense of
autonomy of conventional economícs necessarily implies freedom of value-
judgements.
6. The reconstruction of the unorthodox economic frame of reference
The unorthodox frame of reference greatly differs from that of orthodox
economics. It is not based on an individualistic conception of social
reality. Compared to the orthodox vision, this frame of reference is
based upon a more collectivistic conception of social reality. The
economic system and its elements are related to one another and are to
be understood only in their relationship. The economic process itself
thus forms a subsystem within the entire social process. M. Hollis and
E. Nell therefore declare: "This reflects a difference in views about
the nature of society and the individual".14) The individual does not
exist prior to or outside society. Man is seen as a participant in
society and society is considered to be a reality that is formed by
persons líving in this society. Although the different unorthodox theo-
ries do not use directly the same elaborated theory, yet it is justified
to speak of dialectics. "Dialectics" in the general sense used by J.
Habermas in this context means: "the attempt at any moment to understand
the analysis as a part of the social process and as its possible criti-
cal self-awareness",15)
The dialectíc philosophy that regards reality as a mutual process be-
tween entirety and its parts, fits in the frame of these unorthodox
economic theories in the same way as critical rationalism and logical9
positivism fit in the framework of orthodox economic thought. In dia-
lectical philosophy, there is no absolute autonomy of the individual
such as we find in the frame of reference of orthodox economícs. In the
dialectical meaning-context individual and society are related to each
other ín relative autonomy. Sut this immedíately calls for the observat-
íon that the expression 'relative autonomy' must be understood in the
dialectic sense and not in the sense of absolute autonomy. The latter
usually happens and in that case the term 'relative autonomy' gets, in
connotation with absolute autonomy, the trivial meaning of a little
autonomy. This term, however, signífies a dialectic mutuality, in which
both poles of individual and society are related to each other (relat-
ive) and at the same time differentiated from each other (autonomous).
The dialectíc process and its corresponding method produce the following
concept of economic science. The economic object forms a part of and is
determined by the totality of social development. Economic science must
be widened to political economy. The social process is a meaningful
reality. Certain value-patterns are sedimented in its institutions. The
facts of economic science are as it were solidified values. In contrast
to the logical positivistic method of orthodox economics, the historical
and the value- or goal-directed aspect of the economic object is emphas-
ized.
The scientific subject is in its turn influenced by the same social-
economic context in its relationship to the economic object. The social-
economic world with its determínations is researched by people that are
themselves determined by this social-economic world. W. Weisskopf says:
"Social reality, for example, the economy, cannot be understood as an
object juxtaposed to a detached observing subject".16) The political
philosopher Ch. Taylor tries to show in what way normative ideas have
been incorporated in the language and the concepts that are being used,
however neutral of values the claims and the pretentions often may seem
with respect to that.l~) The subject as researcher of the object is
biased. So the economic facts have socially been preformed along two
sides, on the one hand by the historical social character of the observ-
ed economic object and on the other by the historical social position of
the observing subject.10
The terms subjective and objective, however, must again be understood in
the dialectic frame of reference of unorthodox economics. Here we are
dealing with an entirely innate relationship between the subject and the
object of economic science. Unlike in positivistically-oriented econom-
ics the subject bears no external relation to its object of knowledge.
This relationship has, however, always been prestructured in a certain
way. It is a matter of dialectic mutuality in which both poles are
related to each other and therefore remain differentiated from each
other. We are here so to speak concerned with a biased objectivity.
According to the unorthodox view, the practise of economic theorizing
is, like every activity in a certain social context, ínfluenced by group
loyalty and in this respect it is biased. This evaluative science does
not advocate with this a subjective partiality in the sense that arbi-
trary, subjective valuations are allowed to take part in scientific
pursuits. A biased objectivity is needed as far as an appreciative
understanding of the future is concerned, which is already outlined in
the social facts of the present. In his paper on the humanistic recon-
struction of economic science J. Wisman thinks it necessary to broaden
the horizon to the dialectic relationship between scientific pursuits
and the broader social setting in which they are located.18~
All the same it has become evident that the orthodox and the unorthodox
economists look differently at the term values. In the first approach
values are rather considered to be a'quod' whereas the other approach
regards them as a'quo'.19~ The positivistic approach emphasizes the
objectivation in the form of value-judgements, whereas the dialectic
approach primarily aims at the nature and directedness of social reality
on the basis and in the light of which objectivating value-judgements
are arrived at. The scientific value-judgement has nothing to do with
subjective-arbitrary valuations and normative economics has no intention
at all to impose reality a priori with certain norms, but it wants to
discover these norms in the tendencies of reality. What matters are the
values which are more or less completely realized in the social process
and which the scientists are not to impose on the phenomena from their
own personal preference, but which they have to discover in the social
phenomena themselves.11
It is obvious that within the dialectic contex[ of unorthodox economics
no 'value-free' science in the sense of the orthodox economists can be
advocated. It would be an unlogical and inconsistent act within its own
frame of reference. After all it is asstmied that the social process
determines everything within its own frame-work and that political
values are reflected in theoretical basic concepts. A value-neutrality
is neither possible nor desirable in the orthodox frame of reference. In
the dialectic vision an attempt to eliminate the subjective element
would not lead to a higher degree of objectivity. Only if the political
values are critically made explicit, they increase the scientific cha-
racter.
Some unorthodox economists commit the above mentioned inconsístency.
Neo-ínstitutionalist A. Gruchy aims at a political economy but one in
which the scientist himself should set about devoid of value-judgements
in the orthodox sense of the word.20~ It strikes us as inconsistent that
A. Gruchy argues on the one hand that the indívidual is a product of a
social system, whereas the indívidual scientist can suddenly shake off
this social stipulation. In fact we see here an unorthodox point of view
being defended with orthodox notions and arguments.
The normative engagement of science does not make the method of theoret-
ical detachment redundant. The dialectic process with its relative
autonomy does not intend to obscure the unity nor the distinction be-
tween the aubject and object of knowledge. But this scientific 'detach-
ment' should be understood within the frame of reference of unorthodox
thought. Relative autonomy means here, as we have already seen above,
that both poles are related to each other and it is exactly in this
relationship that they perform an independent function. As far ar 'rel-
ationship' is concerned this means that the social meaning-context
wíthout scientific elaboration is empty. Conversely economic science
without this philosophical world-view is blind. As far as autonomous
function is concerned: the values make up the meaning-context in the
light of which science defines its activities. When elaborating scienti-
fic theories and critically examining the points of departure science
should in its turn observe the ínternal scientific criteria of logical
precision, consistency and empirical testing.12
Value-freedom is differently coloured. Sometímes the dialectic economist
has been likened to somebody who performs his value-free or autonomous
function within a room that is completely value-loaded. Positivistic
economics with its idea of absolute autonomy evokes the image of a
roofless ecientist or rather of someone who can leave the value-loaded
room and can look at it from the outside. Dialectic economics sticks to
the opinion that the value-loaded room, as a horizon, can only be seen
and recognized from the inside.
The dialectic frame of reference does not directly deny the basic pre-
supposí[ion of modern analytical phílosophy that norma cannot be derived
from facts. However, this prínciple of D. Hume is again differently
looked at. Hume's thesis has as a background the separation of the fíeld
of objectíve scientific knowledge and the field of subjective ethical
decisions. In reality this means a philosophical-ideological reflection
of the liberal separation of the public and the private domaín. Dialect-
ical thought does accept here a distinction but does not accept the
absence of any relationship, Even though the 'ought' cannot be derived
from the 'is' and conversely the 'is' not from the 'ought', yet it is a
different matter whether the 'is' does noet influence the 'ought' and
whether especially the 'ought' does not influence the 'is' strongly. J.
Eliott speaks of 'interdependence' instead of 'independence'.21~ Dia-
lectic thought especially considers this interdependence, even though it
is not logically possible for dialectic thought to derive norms from
facts.
7. The problem of translation
So here are many misunderstandings between the practitioners of orthodox
and those of unorthodox economics because they speak from different
political presuppositions and within different frames of reference.
Communication between these worlds of thought remains very difficult
because the basic concepts are continually used either slightly diffe-
rent or analogous. A certain term should first be understood as much as
possible withín its own frame of reference and only then the translatíon
to one's own range of ideas can be attempted. The mistake is usually13
made that a term from a different language-system is immediately trans-
lated within one's own world of ineaning. A false tranalation is made
then because somebody imprints his own frame of signification on the
'strange' world.
It already became evident in the preceding paragraphs that the differen-
ce between both partíes in the debate on value-freedom is not in a pro
or contra autonomy, in a pro or contra value-freedom, in a pro or contra
commítment to values. As the basis of the problem can be traced back to
a difference in views of man and of society, we have to do here with a
different view on autonomy, value-freedom and commitment to values and
not with a pro or contra these characteristics.
Some authors use the following threefold distinction which can be traced
back to M. Weber to defend the question whether social sciences should
be or should not be value-free. Three phases are distinguished in scien-
ce: namely the input (the 'what', the selection of problems), a second
phase of processing (the 'how') and the output (the 'what for', the
application) or put differently: the context of discovery, justification
and application of economic theory. Positivistic economists such as J.
Schumpeter,22) F. Hayek, T. Hutchison, H. Albert and many others recog-
nize that the input of the issue heavily depends on political valuat-
ions. This is called: 'Selective points of view'. Many even emphasize,
like K. Popper, the heuristic value of these ideological presupposi[-
ions. "Such value-judgements are regarded by these scientists as 'pre-
scientific' and, as such, pose no problems for the view that the process
of economic theory ítself is, ideally, value-free."23) The output or the
applications are determined by political value-judgements as well. The
intetmediate phase of processing or the economic research is free of
value-judgements in the one víew and not in the other. Many authors it
is true like e.g. F. Hayek,24) who essentially advocate value-freedom,
admit that value-judgements virtually always play a part. The advocates
of unorthodox economics, however, do not appreciate this participation
as a restriction which should be overcome as much as possible, but as a
positive quality. Selective poínts of view not only limit the range, but
also determine the nature or the context of the empirical truth. G.
Myrdal, who still thought he could distinguish between values and facts14
in his juvenile work: Political Element in the Development of Ecoomic
Theory which was published in 1930, reconsidered this problem in his
later publications Economic Theory and Underdevelopment Regions, pu-
blished in 1957, in the chapter: The Logical Crux of All Science. There-
fore P. Streeten describes Myrdal's view as follows: "values are not
something to be discarded, nor even something to be made explicit in
order to be separated from empirical matter, but are ever present and
premeate empirical analysis through and through".25)
The threefold distinction which has strong connotations with the positi-
vistic frame of reference does not say anything about the political
influence of the processing phase. However, the whole i ssue is to under-
stand [his determination correctly, for here too a'systematic' confus-
íon of notions threatens to aríse because of the mixíng up of two diffe-
rent systems of language. The one frame of reference talks about a
causal explanation and the other about a rational explanation.
In the positivistic view of science social determination is seen as an
influence of causal factors. Because the background, or the transcen-
dental frame, of this nomological explanation is formed out of causes by
a'technical interest' in the sense of J. Habermas, the reasons of human
action are easily represented as causes. The deceptiveness of scientific
attitude is that it makes the reasons appear to be the causes. Kant
would call thís 'transcendental appearance'.
The transcendental frame of dialectíc thought which is less formed by a
nomological than by a dialogical attitude, speaks in this social deter-
mination in terms of rational explanation, which is to say: it inquires
after reason (ratio) and not after the cause (causa) of a certain human
action.
It is true that there are many dífferent points of view concerning this
rational explanation. According to (socío)linguistics this reason-ex-
planation starts from a rule-directed behaviour, which does not state a
causal systematic relationship. The rules namely function as norm or
standard. The phenomenological tradition speaks of the human situation,
which acts upon the action not as a cause, but as a motive. Hermeneutic15
approach speaks in this connection of a horizon which profiles human
expressions as a background. The horizon exercises no causal influence,
but grants sense. In the more dialectic tradition the human way of life
is based on a consensus which is argumentatively regulated.
It is outside the scope of this article to have a closer look at the
different views of thís ratíonal explanation of socíal sciences. It
appears to be essential that socíal reality should not be regarded as a
natural phenomenon. By reflection in any form whatsoever it is possible
to account for human actions and to change these in a critical sense.
The dífference in language-systems also gives rise to a systematic
misunderstanding of the expression 'politicization of economic science'.
Politicization of the economic science in the orthodox economic context
with its prejudice, based on absolute autonomy, that the subjec[ domin-
ates the object, means that economic science is forced to enter ideo-
logy's service. Politicization of the economíc science here means that
this science becomes the object of politicization (the term 'of' denotes
a genetivus objectiws here). Truly economic science does not want and
is not allowed to be politicized.
According to the unorthodox economíc frame of interpretation with its
díalogical attitude on the basis of relative autonomy economic science
is surrounded by a matrix of political presuppositions. Politicization
within this context means that economic science should critically con-
sider its political presuppositions and consequences. Politicization of
economic science here points at a genetiws subjectivus; economic scien-
ce is the subject instead of the object of the politicizing activity.
Unorthodox economics does not also want to politicize science in the
sense that it will aid and abet a political ideology and thereby will
simply give up its value-freedom.
8. A comparíson of the two language-systems
The preceding paragraphs have, it is hoped, made clear the threat that
orthodox and unorthodox economics talk at cross-purposes. As we are
concerned with fundamentally different points of departure, a mutual16
denunciation has set in. In this context L. Wittgensteín says: "Where
two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one an-
other, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic".26~ The
usual accusations to and for are well-known. With these mutual reproach-
es one looks again too much through one's own spectacles at the other.
In our opinion unorthodox economics is right when it draws the attention
to [he ideological implications of positívistic orthodox economics. The
positivistic postulate of value-freedom means that orthodox economics
cannot ascertain its political a priori's, which are in essence founded
on normative points of departure. The dialectic method is to be preferr-
ed here in as far as it exposes the transcendental political frame of
reference, in other words: in as far as it practises ídeology-criticism.
The merit of transcendental political reflection is that it attempts to
come to grips with the political ideologies that are implicitly active
in every theoretical argumentation. Orthodox economics itself is unable
to lay the content of its theory open to scientific criticism.
Now observe: this criticism is, as J. Habermas has well observed, not
directed against the empirícal-analytical praxis of orthodox economists,
but only against the positivistic interpretation thereof. Orthodox
economics takes, as far as its status as a science is concerned, a very
advanced rank, but its methodological strength is its weakness at the
metalevel.
The positivistic attitude leads to a language-game with a causal explan-
ation of natural economic regularities instead of a language game with a
rational explanation, in which ecnomíc actíons are apperceived as the
object of critical reflection. The fact that the orthodox doctrine
positivistically interprets the empirical-analytícal approach of econom-
ic phenomena, gives rise to the complaint that it only promotes the
'status quo' and only describes economy in mechanistic terms of price-
and market-mechanísm.
The transcendental reflection on the implicit value-background of eco-
nomic science functions as a critical standard, by which moral success
or failure of economic activity can be judged. This is where its merit17
is, but at the same time its limitation. Values can never be wielded as
premises in order to derive from that conclusions for reality. If one is
to regard this transcendental foundation as a first prínciple from which
axiomatically other principles can be derived, then K. Popper's critical
rationalism is right in its reproach of an infinite regression. But a
person such as K. Apel has exhaustívely shown that this foundation is
not concerned wíth a'previous' datum but with a value-background which
is actually present in every social activity.27)
Unorthodox economics is constantly threatened by the danger to [hink
that its economic theoríes possess a'surplus value' merely on the basis
of the fact that they pay attention to ethical aspects through transcen-
dental reflection. The accusation of dogmatic arrogance originates here.
Unorthodox economics is never allowed solely on the basis of its value-
presuppositions to decide on the falsity of other economic theories nor
is it allowed to legitimate its own theory on the basis of this notion
without substantial scientific research. Dialectical thought with its
ideology-criticism wants, ethically speaking, above all to make the
values explicit that play a part in every economic theory and to ask in
critical reflection to what extent economic theory approaches or blocks
this normative background.
The question that still remains is whether ethícs, besides this function
of critical standard, which ís a rather negative standard, can also give
positive instructions for the draft of economic institutions. That it is
impossible for ethics to do so without profoundly ascertaining that
which can be objectively known, has become clear from the above. The
question is, however, whether ethics can make a positive contribution
especially at a time in which the consensus on norms and world-views is
subject to erosion.
K. Apel, J. Habermas of the 'Frankfurterschule' and P. Lorenzen and 0.
Schwemmer of the 'Erlanger Schule' occupy themselves with the positive
~oundabílity of ethical norms. Their views which of course show mutual
differences, are characterized as communicative ethics, because commun-
i~ative society (Kommunikationsgemeinschaft) takes a central posítion
here. This notion is in fact translation of the notion democracy. It18
denotes that all claims and norms should be justified by dialogue. Norms
do not have to be proved but should be argumented on sound grounds. The
logic of argumentation (ars rhetorica) is called on which has a long
philosophical tradition and which datea back to Aristotles. Authors like
Ch. Perelman and S. Toulmín emphasize that rational and substantial
discussions are possible in all sorts of fields without applying the
strict rules of intersubjectíve testing which are requíred in the field
of logical-mathematical and empirical-analytical sciences. Otherwise the
danger lurks that many fields are surrendered to irrationalism and
subjectivism.28)19
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